Στο πλαίσιο της συνεχούς επιμόρφωσης των αξιωματικών της Εθνικής Φρουράς διεξήχθη, στις εγκαταστάσεις του Συντονιστικού Κέντρου «ΖΗΝΩΝ», εκπαίδευση στη νέα επιχειρησιακή σχεδίαση με εκπαιδευτές αξιωματικούς της Ανωτάτης Διακλαδικής Σχολής Πολέμου της Ελλάδας (ΑΔΙΣΠΟ).

Η εκπαίδευση περιελάμβανε 2 κύκλους εκπαιδεύσεως όπως παρακάτω:

• 1ος Κύκλος εκπαιδεύσεως (ασύγχρονη τηλεκπαίδευση) κατά τον οποίο οι εκπαιδευόμενοι αξιωματικοί με τη χρήση διαδικτύου μελέτησαν το εκπαιδευτικό υλικό μέσω της ιστοσελίδας της ΑΔΙΣΠΟ.

• 2ος Κύκλος εκπαιδεύσεως διάρκειας δύο εβδομάδων στην Κύπρο, από 27 Νοεμβρίου – 08 Δεκεμβρίου 2017, με τη φυσική παρουσία των εκπαιδευτών της ΑΔΙΣΠΟ.

Σκοπός της διεξαγωγής του σχολείου ήταν η κατανόηση και αφομοίωση της νέας μεθόδου επιχειρησιακής σχεδίασης, κοινής για όλη την Εθνική Φρουρά και τις Ελληνικές Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις, η οποία, σε συνδυασμό με τη γνώση, την πείρα και την ορθολογική κρίση, να υποβοηθήσει κάθε κλιμάκιο διοίκησης να αντιμετωπίσει και να επιλύσει κατά τον αποτελεσματικότερο τρόπο ένα επιχειρησιακό πρόβλημα.

Στην τελετή λήξης του σχολείου παρευρέθηκε ο Υπαρχηγός του ΓΕΕΦ, Αντιστράτηγος Ανδρέας Μαρκίδης, ο οποίος αρχικά ευχαρίστησε τόσο την ΑΔΙΣΠΟ για την συνδρομή της στην επιτυχή διεξαγωγή του, όσο και τους εκπαιδευτές αξιωματικούς. Συνεχίζοντας ο κ. Υπαρχηγός ενθάρρυνε τους συμμετέχοντες να αξιοποιήσουν την αποκτηθείσα γνώση και τόνισε ότι επιδίωξη του ΓΕΕΦ είναι να συνεχιστεί η συνεργασία με την ΑΔΙΣΠΟ με την διεξαγωγή και άλλων σχολείων στο εγγύς μέλλον.

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One Response

  1. Gunslinger32

    Με την συνεχή αύξηση εφαρμογών απο τον τομέα της πληροφορικής στις σύγχρονες ένοπλες δυνάμεις, ο όρος «στρατηγός η πολεμιστής του πληκτρολογίου» αποκτά πλέον και νόημα στην στρατιωτική πραγματικότητα. 😉

    Μετά από αυτή την χιουμοριστική εισαγωγή, θα ήθελα να παρουσιάσω μερικές ενδιαφέρουσες αναφορές σχετικά με το θέμα, από μια μελέτη του αμερικανικού στρατού.

    Όταν πρίν απο σχεδόν είκοσι χρόνια ήλθα για πρώτη φορά σε επαφή με αυτό το θέμα, δεν μπορούσα να φανταστώ τι μέγεθος θα έπαιρνε μια μέρα αυτή η διαδικασία μετασχηματισμού των ΕΔ. Αυτό το πρόγραμμα των Αμερικανών πρωτοπαρουσιάστηκε εκείνη την εποχή με τον τίτλο «Commander the quarterback of the digitized battlefield».

    Εδώ είναι μερικά ενδιαφέροντα αποσπάσματα, από μια πιο εκτεταμένη περιγραφή του αμερικανικού στρατού.

    USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT

    DIGITIZATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
    by
    Colonel Christopher V. Cardine United States Army

    U. S. Army War College
    Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

    The introduction of information based weapon systems capable of providing combat vehicle crews with not only the effective firepower of larger organizations but also the knowledge base to coordinate and employ both on-board and external sensors and weapons will change the current tactics, techniques and procedures of the U.S. Army. Various issues associated with the «digitization of the battlefield» are discussed including protocols, communications requirements, organizational changes, sensor fusion options, and the impact of technology on 21st century warfare.

    One should be skeptical of any military strategist who claims certainty about the future of warfare, especially those who assert that technology changes the fundamental nature of war.

    General Gordon R. Sullivan

    I.
    THE NEW WORLD
    The purpose of this paper is to demystify the term ‘digitization of the battlefield,» put the information processing technology of the microchip into perspective, assess the current impact of digitizing
    weapon systems, and discuss digitization’s potential to change the American way of war in the 21st Century.
    The unprecedented success of the American armed forces in the Gulf War has given rise to many declarations of the birth of a new form of warfare based on the technology of the microchip and the processing of digitally encoded information. As LTG(ret.) Frederick Brown has recently observed, «The technological arbiter of land power success has moved from the internal combustion engine and atom to the microchip.»

    The internal combustion engine and the radio coupled with Blitzkrieg tactics introduced a speed of warfare that exceeded the capacity of outdated militaries to respond effectively. The overwhelming success of the Germans in Poland and France was heralded as a revolution in warfare. The microchip coupled with information based tactics is seen as the next quantum leap forward in gaining a decisive edge in warfare.

    The utilization of the microchip, by both men and machines, to process information is seen as the key element for achieving future victory. By facilitating our ability to turn within the decision loop of the enemy, we will be able to outmaneuver him physically and mentally.3 This can occur at the tactical, operational or strategic levels of war by obtaining and acting on information faster than our opponent. It is this generation, movement, processing, displaying, and utilization of information digitally by both men and machines that gives rise to the term «digitization of the battlefield.»

    Before discussing digitization’s impact, a brief description of what is meant by the term «digital» is necessary. Digitization is the encoding of any information into a discrete or discontinuous signal by partitioning the signal and assigning it a numerical binary code (one/zero) value. These codes are less sensitive to noise, interference from other frequencies, signal distortion and fading, and have greater transmission efficiency than continuously variable (analog) signals. Because these signals are in a numerical code they can be processed by computers using mathematical algorithms to manipulate the information for many purposes. Conversion of the digital signal into an analog signal is done by use of a modulator – demodulator (modem) device.4 This digital technology and the analog-to-digital I digital-to-analog conversions are the physical bases that permit the transmission and processing of vast amounts of data by computers and is the enabling technology of the ‘information age.

    II.
    THE INFORMATION AGE
    The description of the information age and information based warfare, called Third Wave War, was discussed by futurists, Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Their underlying theory is that warfare has gone through three major revolutions based on societal structure. First Wave War was based on cyclical patterns of war driven by agricultural needs. Second Wave War resulted from the massification of society and armies as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Third Wave War is now emerging as information based war.

    «A military revolution, in the fullest sense, occurs only when a new civilization arises to challenge the old, when an entire society transforms itself, forcing its irmed services to change at every level simultaneously – from technology and culture to organization, strategy, tactics, training, doctrine, and logistics. When this happens, the relationship of the military to the economy and society is transformed, and the military balance of power on earth is shattered.»

    The transformation bringing about this latest revolution is the integration of information technology from the civil sector into the military structure of the United States. The physical manifestation of this revolution in the U.S. Army is often called ‘digitization of the battlefield.* The physical devices of information technology are only an element, although an important one, in this revolution. The other element is the intellectual renaissance that is taking place to exploit the technology to support military operations.

    This second element is embodied by the growing body of military thought and writings devoted to what was first termed the Military Technological Revolution (MTR) and then later expanded to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The MTR/RMA is a result of a combination of factors that began about twenty-five years ago with the introduction of smart weapons. It continues to gain influence over the technologies, organizations, and doctrinal thinking of the military as new ways are thought of to use and exploit information technology to train, organize, and fight. In their monograph, Land Warfare in the 21st Century, General Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, and LTC Dubik identify the MTR as one of three elements of change that will have the most profound effect on future warfare.7 However, as the opening quotation in Section I. clearly warns, one must beware of the claim that technology alone will change the nature of war.

    The «military-technical revolution» discussed by Sullivan and
    Dubik is defined by five dominant technological trends:
    • Lethality and
    • Volume and precision of fire dispersion
    • Integrative technology
    • Mass and effects
    • Invisibility and detectabilitys

    Others are using the term Revolution in Military Affairs to refer to many aspects of military forces besides technology including the combination of innovative technologies, doctrine, operational concepts, and military organization.

    Another term for the RMA, *Cyberwar,» was recently coined by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt of the Rand Corporation.

    «Cyberwar refers to conducting and, preparing to conduct, military operations according to information- related principles. It means disrupting, if not destroying, information and communication systems, broadly defined to include even military culture, on which an adversary relies in order to know itself: who it is, where it is, what it can do when, why it is fighting, which threats to counter first, and so forth. It means trying to know everything about an adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about oneself. It means turning the *balance of information and knowledge» in one’s favor, especially if the balance of forces is not. It means using knowledge so that less capital and labor may have to be expended.’»0
    All of these thoughts contain the common thread that those who best use digitally processed information in the future will become the dominant military power in the world.

    To re-engineer the American Army to lead the world in information warfare, General Sullivan has promulgated a strategic vision to focus the change process. It is:

    The Army’s Strategic Vision
    • A total force trained and ready to fight
    • Serving the nation at home and abroad
    • A strategic force capable of decisive victory»

    The plan for achieving this vision in the Information Age is discussed in the next section.

    Συμπεράσματα απο την παραπάνω εργασία.

    VIII.
    FUTURE WAR
    Be very careful how you design your machines. Remember you have the patent on the machine and the option to change it. God has the patent on man and he is not going to change his design.

    LTC Nicholas A. Andreacchio Commander, 2-77AR, 1977

    Will all of this advanced information technology and digitization fundamentally change war as we know it?

    Sullivan and Dubik conclude their paper on warfare in the 21st Century with the observation that three continuities exist in the nature of warfare:

    1st; The future will differ little from the past with regard to the root causes of war.
    2nd; The nature of war remains a contest of wills where one group attempts to force
    its will on others.
    3rd; War demands both science and art from the leaders who wage it.

    These three continuities remain because it is still people and not the technologies that determine the outcome of war.

    Although this paper discussed a single, illustrative organizational change in combined arms forces there are obviously many other possible options. Digital technologies and the restructuring of the communications architectures to support them will provide numerous ways to organize for «conventional» combat in the future. They provide tremendous capability; however, they must be weighed carefully against their vulnerabilities.

    The warrior ethic* must now permeate the entire infrastructure. This is due to the exponential growth in the lethality of single individuals or crews whose effectiveness is based on digital capabilities, but dependent on inter-netted information databases. The entire organization must function as a symbiotic whole produce the levels of information necessary to win on a battlefield that encompasses millions of square miles and billions of bits of data.
    We have mastered the art and science of training the traditional warriors at the various training centers such as the NTC, CMTC, and JRTC. We must now train the entire force to this level of battlefield proficiency for it may not be on the front lines where battles and campaigns are fought and won. Information age warriors will have to deal with electromagnetic pulses, viruses and Trojan horses attacking their databases as well as artillery rounds bursting in the-air.
    In the future, as new enemies attempt to impose their will on our nation, they may not field Combined Arms Armies, Republican Guard Corps, or gangs firing volleys of RPG’s. Instead we may see.

    «Small, highly mobile elements, composed of very intelligent soldiers armed with high-technology weapons, (who) may range over wide areas, seeking critical targets. Targets may be more in the civilian, rather than tie military, sector. Front-rear terms will be replaced with targeted-untargeted.

    Aas we continue to modernize, digital technology is already changing the American way of war; however, the nature of not changed. The dangerous adversary of the 21st Century will not be one who attacks the technology or who develops technologies, but the one who attacks the will to employ technology effectively.

    The microchip and information are revolutionary new capabilities to exploit. They may in fact, change the physical appearance of the future battlefield. In the end, however, it
    the leaders who can impose their will on their adversary war has other that will be by leveraging the technologies to influence the enemy’s will to resist, not the devices themselves that will determine the victor.

    Περισσότερα για ανάγνωση της πλήρες εργασίας εδώ: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a280088.pdf

    Απάντηση

ΔΕΝ επιτρέπονται απαξιωτικοί και υβριστικοί χαρακτηρισμοί εναντίον στελεχών των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων και των Σωμάτων Ασφαλείας. Υποβάλλοντας το σχόλιο σου επιβεβαιώνεις ότι έχεις διαβάσει και αποδεχθεί τους όρους χρήσης και σχολιασμού του ιστοτόπου. Η ευθύνη των σχολίων (αστική και ποινική) βαρύνει τους σχολιαστές. Οι απόψεις που εκφράζονται δεν αντιπροσωπεύουν εκείνες της "Προέλασης" και δεν πρέπει να εκλαμβάνονται ως τέτοιες.

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